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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
If you wanted to convince the public that 
international trade agreements are a way to let 
multinational companies get rich at the expense of 
ordinary people, this is what you would do: give 
foreign firms a special right to apply to a secretive 
tribunal of highly paid corporate lawyers for 
compensation whenever a government passes a law 
to, say, discourage smoking, protect the 
environment or prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Yet 
that is precisely what thousands of trade and 
investment treaties over the past half century have 
done, through a process known as “investor-state 
dispute settlement”, or ISDS.1 
  
This paper focuses on the main venue for investor-state dispute 
settlement:  the World Bank Group’s International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  The paper’s analysis 
establishes significant ICSID bias in favor of corporations and 
commercial interests. 
At its core, the paper is a case study of what transpired after the 
government of El Salvador did not approve a mining concession for 
a Canadian mining company and subsequently implemented an 
environmentally-inspired moratorium on metals mining.  The case 
study was chosen in part because it is unusual for a poorer-country 
government to prioritize the environmental costs of mining over 
potentially significant foreign-exchange earnings from gold 
deposits.  The paper presents the Salvadoran case study by moving 
from the local level to the national level in El Salvador, and then 
proceeds to the global level to follow the investor-state suit filed by 
Pac Rim Cayman against the Salvadoran government at the World 
Bank Group’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes. 
The paper bookends the Salvadoran case-study with a broader 
look at ICSID.  The author begins with a brief history of ICSID, from 
its controversial birth fifty years ago to its controversial present 
                                                     
1  Investor-state Dispute Settlement: The Arbitration Game, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 
2014, at 78, available at http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-
arbitration. 
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moment. Following the Salvadoran case, the author returns to 
reflections on ICSID and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in 
current and proposed trade and investment agreements. 
The paper’s analysis of the El Salvador case, framed within the 
broader umbrella of ICSID itself, reveals that ICSID is biased and 
flawed in two main ways: (1) ICSID is biased in favor of corporate 
and commercial interests over both government and non-corporate 
non-governmental actors; and (2) ICSID excludes consideration of 
vital, non-commercial interests such as the environment and the 
broader public good.  As the author will argue, these two biases 
reinforce one another and make ICSID an institution ill-suited to 
deal with the key challenges of our current historical moment and 
of the future. 
It is important to note the author writes as an interdisciplinary 
scholar of development studies, building on academic expertise in 
economics, ecology, and political economy (among other fields) 
alongside decades of practice in rural communities, from the 
Philippines to El Salvador, as well as hands-on policy experience 
(notably as an international economist in the US Treasury 
Department). 
 
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ICSID 
 
Let us begin with a brief but important history of ICSID, which 
will help frame the debates surrounding this institution, as well as 
threads that will be further explored in the Salvadoran case study. 
ICSID was created some 50 years ago, opening its doors in 1966, 
to deal with government expropriation of property of foreign 
investors.2 
The author’s historical research reveals, however, that ICSID has 
been controversial since before it opened its doors.  Indeed, at the 
1964 World Bank annual meeting in Tokyo, 21 developing-country 
governments voted “no” on the convention to set up this new part 
of the World Bank Group where foreign corporations could sue 
governments and bypass domestic courts.3  The 21 included all of 
the 19 Latin American countries attending as well as the Philippines 
                                                     
2  ICSID, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, at 5, ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006). 
3  ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 66-67 (2012).   
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and Iraq.4  The historic vote was dubbed “El No de Tokyo,” or the 
Tokyo No.5  It is worth noting that, in the history of World Bank 
initiatives, the vote stands as significant in terms of the large number 
of participating countries against the initiative as well as the united 
stance of all Latin American representatives. 
It is also significant in terms of the reasons the 21 voted no.  In 
the words of then-representative of Chile, Félix Ruiz, speaking on 
behalf of the Latin American countries voting no: 
 
The legal and constitutional systems of all the Latin 
American countries that are members of the Bank 
offer the foreign investor at the present time the 
same rights and protection as their own nationals; 
they prohibit confiscation and discrimination and 
require that any expropriation on justifiable 
grounds of public interest shall be accompanied by 
fair compensation fixed, in the final resort, by the 
law courts. 
 
The new system that has been suggested would give 
the foreign investor, by virtue of the fact that he is a 
foreigner, the right to sue a sovereign state outside 
its national territory, dispensing with the courts of 
law.  This provision is contrary to the accepted legal 
principles of our countries and, de facto, would 
confer a privilege on the foreign investor, placing 
the nationals of the country concerned in a position 
of inferiority.6 
 
To emphasize Ruiz’s key points, “the 21” deemed the new 
investor-state dispute settlement system both unnecessary and 
unfair.  It is worth keeping this in mind as we proceed to the case 
                                                     
4  Id.  There were 21 votes against ratifying the ICSID convention, including 
the 19 Latin American World Bank member countries.  The countries voting no 
were:  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  Id. 
5  Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to Replace 
ICSID Arbitration, 2 BEIJING L. REV. 134, 136 (2011); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID 
Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 54 (2009). 
6  PARRA, supra note 3 at 66. 
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study of El Salvador’s mining suit.  To what extent has the 1964 “no” 
vote been vindicated by history? 
Despite the “no” votes, the formally titled Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States went forward to states for signatures from March 18, 
1965 until October 14, 1966 when ICSID became a reality.7  For the 
record, Brazil never joined, and in fact has refused to privilege 
international investors through international investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) mechanisms.8 
In its early years, ICSID was small, indeed largely irrelevant. Its 
first case was not filed until 1972, with just over two dozen cases 
filed in total through 1988.  In fact, there were a number of years 
where no cases were filed.9  However, by the mid-1990s, ICSID 
moved center-stage, thanks to the ISDS clauses inserted in neoliberal 
bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements that 
were proliferated starting in the 1980s and that exploded in the 
1990s.10  In 2012 alone (forty years after ICSID’s first case was filed), 
                                                     
7  ICSID, supra note 2 at 5. 
8 To expand upon this point for clarity (and fact-checking):  Brazil has refused 
to ratify the ICSID Convention or any bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with an 
ISDS mechanism.  Note that, while Brazil has signed onto some such BITs, they 
have not been ratified by Brazil’s Congress, which sees them to be against the 
country’s Constitution.  Brazil does have arbitration agreements in contracts with 
foreign investors.  See Ricardo Berretto Ferreira Da Silva et al., Arbitration & ADR – 
Brazil: Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Arbitration, INT’L LAW OFFICE 
(May 15, 2003), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/ 
detail.aspx?g=6ce64813-8cf6-4f97-b8a8-2ad950fa25ad (providing access to the BITs 
and international arbitrations at issue).   
For more on this, see Elizabeth Whitsitt & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Investment 
Arbitration in Brazil: Yes or No?, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2008), 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2008/11/30/investment-arbitration-in-brazil-yes-or-
no/ (illustrating Brazil’s refusal to formally ratify the ICSID Convention or BITs 
with an ISDS mechanism); ICSID, ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/ _layouts/ 
mobile/mbllists.aspx (displaying ICSID caseload statistics and annual reports). 
9  PARRA, supra note 3 at 199-260; Nicolas Boeglin, ICSID and Latin America: 
Criticism, Withdrawal and the Search for Alternatives, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (Dec. 
3, 2013), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp- content/ uploads/ 2013/ 
12/At-Issue-ICSID.pdf.  
10  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 
International Investment Rule-Making: Stocktaking, Challenges and the Way 
Forward, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/3, U.N. Sales No. E.08.II.D.1 (2008), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit20073_en.pdf; Jonathan C. Hamilton, A Decade of 
Latin American Investment Arbitration, LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARB.: 
THE CONFLICTS & CONTROVERSIES 69-82 (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Mary H Mourra, 
eds. 2008). 
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48 new cases were added to ICSID’s docket.  All of the 48 cases were 
filed against governments of developing countries.11  And, of these 
48 cases, more than one-third (17 or 35.45%) related to extractive 
industries.12 
 
3. EL SALVADOR & GOLD MINING: FROM LOCAL, TO NATIONAL, TO 
GLOBAL 
 
With that framing and history of ICSID and the debate 
surrounding it, let us now turn to the basic contours of the case of 
Pac Rim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador.  It is a case that the 
author knows well as a result of four research trips to El Salvador 
and related research in Washington, DC where ICSID is housed at 
the World Bank.13  After presenting the case, the paper will turn to 
broader reflections on bias in investor state dispute settlement at 
ICSID. 
The best way to present the case is to follow its chronology on 
three levels – from local to national to global. 
 
                                                     
11  Sarah Anderson & Manuel Perez-Rocha, Mining for Profits in International 
Tribunals: Lessons for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES 6 (Apr. 
2013), available at http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ 
Mining-for-Profits-2013-ENGLISH.pdf. 
12  Id. 
13  Unless otherwise noted, the information presented is based on my 
fieldwork in El Salvador.  I conducted field research in El Salvador in April and 
May 2011, July and August 2012, May 2013, and July 2014.  Research ranged from 
more formal interviews (especially the case with interviews conducted with 
government officials in various ministries in San Salvador) to informal, multiple-
day participant observation outside of San Salvador, especially in the province of 
Cabañas.  Research related to ICSID was done in Washington, D.C., where the 
author is based. 
For other useful written sources on this case, see Richard Steiner, El Salvador: 
Gold, Guns, and Choice, INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE (IUCN) 
COMM’N ON ENV’L, ECON., & SOCIAL POL’Y (Feb. 2010), available at 
http://www.walkingwithelsalvador.org/Steiner%20Salvador%20Mining%20Rep
ort.pdf (discussing the backdrop of Pac Rim LLC v. Republic of El Salvador); Robert 
E. Moran, Technical Review of the El Dorado Mine Project Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), El Salvador, (Oct. 2005), http://www.votb.org/elsalvador/ 
Reports/Technical_Review_El_Dorado_EIA.pdf  (detailing technical reports on the 
mine and its environmental impact). 
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3.1 At the local level: 
 
El Salvador’s northern province of Cabañas is one of its poorest 
provinces, with a population comprised largely of farmers, growing 
corn and beans. It is also home to a rich gold vein that runs across 
its Central American neighbors Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua.  When global gold prices began to soar in the early 2000s, 
the Canadian mining company Pacific Rim came to Cabañas in 2002, 
the result of its merger with a company that had under three years 
left of an eight-year exploration license.14  In El Salvador, as in many 
countries, the process for getting a license to explore for gold or 
other minerals is separate from the process for getting approval for 
the actual “exploitation” or the mining concession itself.  With its 
license to explore, Pacific Rim continued exploration operations in 
Cabañas. 
Interviews suggest that many local inhabitants, originally 
intrigued by the prospect of mining jobs, soon became concerned as 
Pac Rim’s exploration operations proceeded.15  Some experienced 
changes in water levels.  Others learned more about the mining 
process (the proximity of ongoing gold mining projects in 
neighboring Honduras facilitated the education).  They learned of 
the toxic cyanide used by mining companies to separate the gold 
from the rock and, in Cabañas as in much of the world, the arsenic 
                                                     
14  Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, El 
Salvador’s Rejoinder on the Merits 6 (July 11, 2014), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3321.pdf 
[hereinafter Pac Rim].  
15  This paragraph is based on the author’s in-country interviews, which 
included Cabañas -based interviews during each of her field trips.  For relevant 
writing by the author that covers this terrain, see Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, El 
Salvador: Toward a Mining Ban, in ENDING THE FOSSIL FUEL ERA 167-193 (T. Princen et 
al. eds., MIT Press, 2015); Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, Poorer Countries and the 
Environment: Friends or Foes? 72 WORLD DEV. 419-31 (2015); Robin Broad & John 
Cavanagh, Like Water for Gold in El Salvador, THE NATION, Aug. 1/8, 2011, available 
at http://www.thenation.com/article/162009/water-gold-el-salvador (noting that 
this was written after the author’s first research trip to El Salvador).  
For another source with details on the local level, see Richard Steiner, El 
Salvador: Gold, Guns, and Choice, INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE; 
COMM’N ON ENVTL., ECON., AND SOC. POLICY, 13, 40-44 (2010), 
http://www.walkingwithelsalvador.org/Steiner%20Salvador%20Mining%20Rep
ort.pdf.  
 The ICSID submissions by both Pacific Rim and the government of El Salvador, 
and especially the July 2014 Rejoinder on Merits by the government, include 
detailed chronologies on what happened and did not happen. 
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embedded in the rock that would be released along with the gold.  
Moreover, they learned of the acid mine drainage that would occur 
as the mining operations exposed the sulfide-bearing rocks to the 
elements.  For these reasons, they became increasingly concerned 
about the environmental impact of mining on both land and water 
they depended on for small-scale agriculture and life in general.  
Overall, their concerns focused on the impact on El Salvador’s main 
Rio Lempa watershed, which supplies over half of El Salvador’s 
drinking water.16 
As concern and knowledge grew among individuals, a number 
of small Cabañas-based non-governmental organizations began 
various activities and organizing, with the intent to keep gold 
mining out of Cabañas.17 
For the purposes of this article, the details of the local level will 
be limited to the above; the author (and others) has written 
extensively about these elsewhere.18  However, before moving to the 
national level, it is important to note that conflict erupted between 
those who were against mining and those, including most local 
mayors and some local Pac Rim employees, who were in favor of 
                                                     
16  See Robert Goodland, Responsible Mining: The Key to Profitable Resource 
Development, 4 SUSTAINABILITY 2099 (2012) (describing the adverse environmental 
impact of gold mining in El Salvador and in general, including the release of arsenic 
and the problem of acid mine drainage).  See also Dina L. Lopez, Professor and 
Department Chair, College of Arts & Sciences, OHIO UNIV., http://www. 
ohio.edu/geology/lopez/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2015) (explaining that her research 
includes focusing on acid mine drainage and contamination in water).  On arsenic 
and gold mining in particular, see generally Jochen Bundschuh et al., One Century 
of Arsenic Exposure in Latin America: A Review of History and Occurrence from 14 
Countries, 429 SCI. OF THE TOTAL ENV’T 2 (2012); WILLIAM HOLDEN & R. DANIEL 
JACOBSON, MINING AND NATURAL HAZARD VULNERABILITY IN THE PHILIPPINES: 
DIGGING TO DEVELOPMENT OR DIGGING TO DISASTER (2012).  
For more on how to assess the environmental, social and economic costs and 
benefits of mining regimes, see Robin Broad, Responsible Mining: Moving from a 
Buzzword to Real Responsibility, 1 THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND SOC’Y  4, 5 (2014) 
(explaining the need for valid definitions of responsible mining); Andrés McKinley, 
Mitos y Realidades de La Minería de Oro en Centroamérica, CARITAS EL SALVADOR (Nov. 
2013), available at http://www.movimientom4.org/wp-content/docs/mitos-y-
realidades-de-la-mineria-de-oro-en-centroamerica.pdf (assessing the 
environmental, social, and economic costs and benefits of mining regimes).   
17  See generally note 15.  For more on domestic and international opposition to 
mining in El Salvador, as well as a list of other publications, see STOPESMINING, 
http://www.stopesmining.org/j25/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). 
18  See supra note 15. 
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the project.  Social conflict escalated, culminating in the brutal 
assassination of three anti-mining activists in 2009.19 
 
3.2 At a national level: 
 
As civil society became more organized against mining in 
Cabañas, so too did it reach out to other groups across the country.  
In 2005, a Salvador-wide coalition – La Mesa Nacional Frente a la 
Mineria Metálica (National Roundtable on Mining)—was created 
that, after some deliberation, decided a key part of its work would 
be to push the national government to ban metallic mining.  Such a 
sentiment had widespread support in El Salvador.  Indeed, by 2007, 
an academic poll indicated that more than 60% of the Salvadoran 
public was against gold mining.20  Notable vocal opponents 
included the Catholic Church, but it was joined by 
environmentalists, human rights advocates, academics, other 
religious denominations, indigenous populations and so on, and 
also larger-scale agribusiness dependent on water.21 
So too, starting around 2005, were individuals in, and segments 
of, the national-level government increasingly concerned about the 
                                                     
19  Id.  
 The details on these 2009 deaths and other subsequent assassinations were 
repeated to the author on numerous occasions.  For more details on the local level, 
including the assassinations, see generally Like Water for Gold in El Salvador, supra 
note 15; RICHARD STEINER, INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND 
COMM’N ON ENVTL., ECON., AND SOC. POLICY, EL SALVADOR: GOLD, GUNS, AND CHOICE 
13, 40-44 (2010), available at http://www.walkingwithelsalvador.org/ 
Steiner%20Salvador%20Mining%20Report.pdf.  
 For more on domestic and international opposition to mining in El Salvador, 
as well as a list of other publications, see also STOPESMINING, supra note 17. 
20  The poll asks: “Do you think El Salvador is an appropriate country for 
metallic mining?”  62.4 percent say “no.”  Consulta De Opinión Pública De Octubre 
De 2007, INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA, UNIVERSIDAD 
CENTROAMERICANA 54 (Nov. 2007), http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/ 
Web/2008/finalmineria040208.pdf.    
21  For related questions on the roles of civil society, the private sector and the 
government, as well as to the overall political economy of El Salvador, see generally 
The Poor and the Environment: Friends or Foes?, supra note 15 at 420-23.  
 On hypotheses related to the role of various social sectors in El Salvador, see 
Rachel Nadelman, Sitting on a Gold Mine:  El Salvador’s Departure from 
Extractive-led Growth (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, School of 
International Service, American University) (on file with author).  Given 
Nadelman’s 2014 fieldwork in El Salvador, her Ph.D. dissertation is likely to 
contribute significantly to this literature. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss4/1
BROAD 9/24/2015  4:06 PM 
2015] CORPORATE BIAS IN SETTLEMENT DISPUTES 861 
environmental and social impacts of mining and the government’s 
own inability to regulate the mining firms.  Interestingly enough, 
research shows that this concern surfaced around 2005 and gelled in 
2006 – when the conservative administration of President Antonio 
Saca was in power.  Then, an unusual and (in this author’s mind) 
far-sighted alliance grew between the Ministry of Economy and the 
Ministry of the Environment over the need to conduct a “strategic 
environmental review,” not just an economic review, before any 
metallic mining activities could proceed or any applications related 
to metallic mining would be processed.  A de facto moratorium was 
thus born.  However, the actual task of conducting such a strategic 
environmental review was left to the progressive Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front (“FMLN”) government elected in 2009.22 
On assuming office on June 1, 2009, President Mauricio Funes 
continued the de facto moratorium on metals mining.  Funes, 
focusing especially on the fragility of Lempa River watershed, 
announced that there would be no mining exploitation licenses or 
concessions granted during his administration.  This stance has 
carried over into a third administration – that of the FMLN’s 
Salvador Sánchez Ceren, who assumed office in July 2014.  As 
Sánchez Ceren’s Minister of Economy stressed in an interview with 
the author, “Our country should be called Lempa . . . because the 
river is everything.”23 
It is important to separate this national-level policy on gold 
mining from the specific case of Pacific Rim.  As noted above, Pacific 
Rim had an exploration license but – and this is key – it never received 
an actual exploitation concession, that is the right to mine.  In order to 
receive an exploitation concession, it needed to meet certain 
conditions; the factual record shows that it never met three of these 
conditions.  (We will return to this in next subsection on the global 
level.)  Pacific Rim, however, argues that, in granting it an 
exploration license, the government of El Salvador was essentially 
giving it a green light on the exploitation license. 
 
 
                                                     
22  This is perhaps why much writing on this case incorrectly credits the Funes 
administration with the initiative on this. 
23  Interview with Tharsis Salomón López, Minister of Economy, in San 
Salvador (July 18, 2014). 
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3.3 At the global level and ICSID: 
 
Rather than pursue the case in El Salvador’s domestic court 
system, Pac Rim filed an international arbitration case against the 
Republic of El Salvador on April 30, 2009.24  This then brings us to 
Washington, D.C. and the World Bank Group’s ICSID. 
An important detail here is that Pac Rim Cayman, not its 
Canada-based parent company Pacific Rim, officially brought this 
case before ICSID.  In a nutshell, Pac Rim’s claim built on the logic 
explained in the prior section:  We received an exploration license, 
so you have to give us exploitation concession – that is, an actual 
mining concession.  We were assured of the government’s support 
for our project repeatedly by a top Salvadoran government official 
and the government’s overall change of mining policy is thus unfair 
and illegal and we should be compensated appropriately by 
ordering El Salvador to pay us the market value of the gold that is 
still under the ground.25  Again, this is the essence of Pac Rim’s 
claim. 
 Then, following ICSID protocol, a case-specific ICSID tribunal 
was set up, composed of  three arbitrators (typically lawyers), each 
one of them paid  $3,000 for every day of work.26  What transpired 
procedurally as the first step was the jurisdictional stage hearing.27  
                                                     
24  See generally Pac Rim, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 14.  To note some key 
dates: The Notice of Intent was filed in December 2008 and the Notice of Arbitration 
in April 2009, before the Funes administration took office.  June 15, 2009 (just two 
weeks after the start of the Funes presidency) was when ICSID registered the 
Request for Arbitration.  Id. ¶ 3.  Note that the ICSID site was changed sometime in 
late 2014 or early 2015; this was formerly 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet>.  
25  See infra Part 3.2 (explaining that Pac Rim received an exploration license, 
but did not meet the conditions necessary for an exploitation concession). 
26  According to the ICSID site, arbitrators are entitled to “a fee of US$3,000 per 
day of meetings or other work performed in connection with the proceedings 
(corresponding to US $375 per hour).”  Claims for Fees and Expenses, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/arbitrators/Pages/Claims-for-
Fees-and-Expenses.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).  
For more on selection and appointment of tribunal members, see Selection and 
Appointment of Tribunal Members – ICSID Convention Arbitration, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/process/Pages/Selection-and-
Appointment-of-Tribunal-Members-Convention-Arbitration.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2015).   
27  Case Details, International Centre For Settlement Of Investment Disputes, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?Cas
eNo=ARB/09/12&tab=DOC (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
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In an example of what critics call “treaty shopping,”28 Pac Rim 
submitted its case under two potential jurisdictions: under the 
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and also under 
El Salvador’s domestic investment law.29  In the jurisdictional 
decision, the tribunal rejected CAFTA’s jurisdiction (rightly so, since 
Canada was not a signatory to CAFTA and the Canadian company’s 
decision to change the nationality of its shell subsidiary from the 
Cayman Islands to the United States did not mean the newly-
established US company could enjoy the benefits of CAFTA).30  
However, the tribunal accepted jurisdiction under the domestic 
investment law.31  This already suggested pro-corporate bias: the 
details of the submission should have led the tribunal to throw out 
the case since Pac Rim claimed that it did not know about the 
potential problems with getting the concession until March 2008, but 
that claim was disproved by indisputable evidence including emails 
from Pac Rim top officials dating as early as 2005.32 (More on this 
below.) 
With jurisdiction accepted, the case moved into its merits – or 
substantive – stage.  It is worth noting that, at ICSID, the merits stage 
is overseen by the same three-person tribunal as the jurisdictional 
                                                     
28  See Inna Uchkunova, Drawing a Line: Corporate Restructuring and Treaty 
Shopping in ICSID Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/03/06/drawing-a-line-corporate-
restructuring-and-treaty-shopping-in-icsid-arbitration/ (defining treaty-shopping 
“as the process of routing an investment so as to gain access to a BIT where one did 
not previously exist or for gaining access to a more favorable BIT protection.”). 
29  Pac Rim, Hearing of Objections to Jurisdiction, supra note 14, Hearing on 
Jurisdiction, 6:18-7:12 (May 2, 2011).  
30  Pac Rim, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 14, ¶ 7.1 (June 1, 2012).  This 
involved the change of nationality of Pac Rim Cayman LLC from the Cayman 
Islands to the United States, without Pac Rim Cayman having any substantial 
business activities in the United States.  
 (More details later in article, infra. pp. 114-15).  
31  Id. 
32  Infra p. 113; Pac Rim, supra note 14, ¶¶ 68-69 (July 11, 2014), available at 
http://www.minec.gob.sv/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=categ
ory&id=26:otros-documentos&Itemid=63.  As the ICSID documents make clear, 
Pac Rim knew this was a possibility shortly after submitting its application for a 
concession, by early 2005.  Id.  The Rejoinder refers to evidence on the record that 
Pac Rim was repeatedly notified of problems with its application from 2005-2007.  
Id. ¶¶ 32-65.  This was well “before then-President Saca confirmed in 2008 that 
mining had to be studied before exploitation could be allowed.” Id. ¶ 65. In May 
2007, the Ministry of Environment (MARN) and the Ministry of Economy told 
mining corporations that there would be no more mining until a “strategic 
environmental evaluation” was completed.  Id. ¶ 64. 
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stage.  In other words, in allowing the case to proceed on 
jurisdictional grounds, the three arbitrators  continue their well-paid 
jobs.  The merits hearing was held in September 2014, with a ruling 
likely sometime in 2015 (unknown as of this writing).33 
The merits stage focused on technical issues and narrow 
grounds:  whether Pac Rim had met the conditions for a mining 
concession.  With meticulous detail (including use of internal Pac 
Rim emails), the government’s lawyers focused on proving that Pac 
Rim knew it had not successfully completed the key three 
requirements for being granted an exploitation concession:  (1) Pac 
Rim did not get government approval for its Environmental Impact 
Study (EIS) because the EIS that Pac Rim submitted was not deemed 
satisfactory, in particular for its failure to cover the full area where 
Pac Rim hoped to mine; (2) Pac Rim did not submit the required 
feasibility study; and (3) Pac Rim was not even close to meeting the 
requirement that it hold titles to (or permission to mine in) all the 
land for which it requested a concession.34  The lack of land titles 
also demonstrates that, contrary to Pac Rim’s claims, the majority of 
the local population was not — and is not — supportive of Pac Rim’s 
plans to mine in Cabañas.  Pac Rim’s attempts to get the land titles 
were not successful:  Pac Rim had less than 13% of the required land 
holdings, lacking more than 87% of land estimated to be owned by 
over 1,000 people.35 
On Pac Rim’s side, lawyers focused on Pac Rim Cayman LLC’s 
President and CEO Thomas Shrake’s statements that he was “not 
aware” of the reality of such legal complications.36  To the contrary, 
however, documents make it clear that Pac Rim well knew that it 
was not able to fulfill these requirements for an exploitation 
                                                     
33  Case Details, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/ 
casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/09/12&tab=DOC (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
34  Robin Broad, Summary of El Salvador’s Rejoinder on the Merits (11 July 2014) 
in Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, THE BLUE PLANET PROJECT (Sept. 
4, 2014), http://www.blueplanetproject.net/index.php/summary-of-el-salvadors-
rejoinder-on-the-merits-11-july-2014-in-pac-rim-cayman-llc-v-the-republic-of-el-
salvador/.  See also Pac Rim, supra note 14, ¶¶ 254-57.  
See also Jen Moore et al., DEBUNKING EIGHT FALSEHOODS BY PACIFIC RIM 
MINING/OCEANAGOLD IN EL SALVADOR: Oceana Gold in El Salvador (Mar. 2014),  
available at http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Eight-
Falsehoods-Final-March-17-2014-WEB.pdf (explaining that Pacific Rim did not 
meet the regulatory requirements to obtain a mining permit).  
35  Pac Rim, supra note 14, ¶ 98. 
36  Id. ¶ 69. 
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concession.  Indeed, as early as 2005 Pac Rim was working with 
President Saca’s vice-president and others to eliminate the 
requirement that it hold all relevant land titles.37  Their plan to get 
around this requirement was to attempt to convince the Salvadoran 
Congress to amend or replace the mining law to remove this 
requirement.38  The above points also refute Pac Rim’s argument 
that a key reason it did not receive an exploitation concession rests 
in the fact that it did not play along with the corruption of the Saca 
administration (2004-2009).39  “This is nonsense,” to quote a sentence 
used in the Rejoinder for another point.40 
The fascinating details of this case are available publicly, thanks 
mainly to documents posted by the Salvadoran government.41  The 
merits stage was held in secret (with no outside observers allowed, 
not even potentially affected individuals who signed amicus briefs).  
Ironically, if this case had proceeded under CAFTA jurisdiction, the 
proceedings would have had to have been made public.  But, in the 
jurisdiction allowed, both sides had to agree to open the hearings, 
and both sides did not.  The author knows from interviews that the 
Salvadoran government was willing to have the merits stage open; 
therefore, it seems reasonable to surmise that Pac Rim opposed such 
transparency. 
The case exposes additional “biases” inherent in ICSID’s 
structures and procedures.  Among them:  Pac Rim Cayman LLC 
has been able to finance its ICSID trial because its financially-
floundering parent company, Pacific Rim, was purchased by 
                                                     
37  Id. ¶¶ 69-70. 
38  Id. ¶¶ 71-72, 230. 
39  High Stakes Poker (2012 Documentary encore), 1:55-2:16, 24:20-25:14 (Nov. 16, 
2012), available at http://www.cbc.ca/player/Radio/The+Sunday+Edition/ 
Full+Episodes/ID/2324862711/. 
40  Pac Rim, supra note 14, ¶ 68 (referring to Pac Rim’s denial that it lobbied the 
government).  Beyond not complying with the requirements needed to get a 
concession and trying to change the law (both, as explained earlier in this article, 
see supra Part 3.2; notes 37-8 and accompanying text), Pac Rim clearly had its own 
plans to circumvent the democratic processes of El Salvador.  Some of this appears 
to have involved hiring key people as employees or consultants, from Manuel 
Hinds to relatives of the vice-president, as well as providing funds to local 
individuals and groups in Cabañas.  See id. ¶¶ 69-70, 285-86, and 445.  In this regard, 
it is unfortunate that the ICSID tribunal did not require that Pacific Rim submit a 
list of those persons to whom it paid more than a certain amount, as would be 
required in a corruption or fraud case. 
41  Descarga de Documentos, MINESTERIO DE ECONOMÍA, GOBIERNO DE EL 
SALVADOR, http://www.minec.gob.sv/index.php?option=com_phocadownload& 
view=category&id=26:otros-documentos&Itemid=63 (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). 
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Canadian/Australian mining company OceanaGold in November 
2013, just as Pacific Rim was running out of money.  As a result, 
Pacific Rim became a wholly owned subsidiary of OceanaGold,42 
with enhanced financial ability to pursue the case at the tribunal.   
But the claimant in this case remains Pac Rim Cayman. 
This means that, should El Salvador win, its win is only against 
Pac Rim Cayman – an entity that, as one knowledgeable insider 
explained, has no actual address, no actual physical presence, no 
bank account, and no actual money, “not a mailbox or a phone or a 
desk.” OceanaGold will not have a legal duty to pay any ICSID 
financial rulings against Pac Rim Cayman.  This is an example of 
what is called “third party funding” – a seemingly unfair situation 
whereby, in this case, Pac Rim can get unlimited financial assistance 
to pursue its case at ICSID, but, if El Salvador wins, it has access only 
to Pac Rim Cayman’s finances.43 
The financial costs of lengthy ICSID cases are also substantial.  
According to insiders, each side has already spent over $12 million. 
Even if El Salvador wins, the arbitrators may not require Pac Rim to 
cover El Salvador’s legal costs.  If El Salvador loses, Pac Rim has 
asked for  $301 million in compensation.  Thus far, the government 
has been insistent that it will pay rather than allow mining.  But an 
El Salvador loss at ICSID could open the flood-gates to ICSID suits 
by other mining companies and, if the cost is high enough, actual 
mining.  It could also have the effect of dissuading other 
governments from putting environmentally-inspired restrictions on 
mining. 
In addition, the case is likely to drag on beyond the merits stage 
into an annulment stage.  Unlike courts and most judicial systems, 
ICSID tribunals are not based on legal precedent, so there is no 
                                                     
42  Press Release, OceanaGold and Pacific Rim Mining, OceanaGold Agrees to 
Acquire Pacific Rim Mining (Oct. 8, 2013) (published on OceanaGold website), 
available at http://oceanagold.com/assets/documents/filings/2013-Press-
Releases/081013OceanaPacRimPressReleaseFINAL2.pdf.  The buyout seems 
reflective of the relationship between “junior” exploratory ventures and more 
“senior” mining companies.  On this relationship between “junior” and “senior” 
mining companies with a focus on Canadian firms, see Michael Dougherty, The 
Global Gold Mining Industry: Materiality, Rent-Seeking, Junior Firms and Canadian 
Corporate Citizenship, 17 COMPETITION AND CHANGE 339 (2013). 
43  Commerce Group Corp. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/17, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, para. 23, 
n. 22 (Aug. 10, 2012), available at http://www.minec.gob.sv/index.php? 
option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=30:commerce-group-vrs-
repblica-de-el-salvador&Itemid=63. 
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appeal on those judicial grounds.  Either side can request an 
annulment of the award based only on “procedural errors in the 
decisional process.”44  Furthermore, the ad-hoc annulment tribunal 
has the power to decide “not to annul notwithstanding that an error 
has been identified. . .” 45 
To conclude this section:  Overall, the author’s detailed research 
provides more than ample evidence and documentation that the 
case of Pac Rim Cayman LLC v the Republic of El Salvador has no 
merit.  If the three ICSID tribunal members decide otherwise, it will 
further prove the point of those who argue that ICSID is an 
institution biased towards corporations and unable to weigh the 
evidence using both the facts at hand and legal precedents.  That this 
case has been allowed to proceed is itself evidence of pro-corporate 
bias. 
Moreover, should El Salvador win, it will be based on legal 
prowess and Pac Rim’s mistakes, not on the fate of the Lempa River 
or the views of the majority of people in Cabañas.  Indeed, the key 
environment issues raised at local and national levels are not 
material in ICSID procedures.  Although El Salvador’s lawyers have 
raised them,46 the impacts of gold mining on the Lempa River and 
the centrality of the Lempa watershed to the future of El Salvador as 
a country are not relevant to the proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
44  ICSID Background Paper on Annulment for the Administrative Council of 
ICSID, para. 72 (Aug. 10, 2012), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 
2012/08/16755063/background-paper-annulment-administrative-council-icsid. 
The logic behind the annulment process is explained by ARON BROCHES, 
Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards,  in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, 
ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995).  Broches was World Bank Vice President and 
general counsel and the key individual involved in ICSID’s creation, where he 
served as Secretary-General from 1967-1980.  
45  ICSID Background Paper on Annulment for the Administrative Council of 
ICSID, para. 63 (Aug. 10, 2012), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 
2012/08/16755063/background-paper-annulment-administrative-council-icsid.  
46  Pac Rim, supra note 14. ¶¶ 57-65, 203-206, 249-255, 252-288; Id., El Salvador’s 
Counter-Memorial on Merits, ¶¶ 249-55 (July 11, 2014). 
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4. FROM CASE STUDY TO ICSID 
 
Let us now build from this case study of Pac Rim Cayman LLC 
v Republic of El Salvador to expand on general points about this key 
investor-state tribunal that is presented by its proponents as a level-
playing field.  As the number of cases brought before ICSID has 
ballooned,47 so too have the criticisms.  As stated in this article’s 
introduction, the arguments are that ICSID rulings are:  (1) 
increasingly biased in favor of investors over the state, and (2) too 
narrow in their focus on commercial rights over broader non-
commercial issues.48 
The first, ICSID’s bias towards corporations, echoes the concerns 
raised by the “Tokyo No” 21 countries fifty years ago.49  Indeed, a 
first conclusion is that the Tokyo No countries were prescient in 
their concerns.  If anything, as ICSID’s workload has expanded and 
as corporations’ global reach has expanded, ICSID appears to have 
become increasingly biased towards private corporate investors. 
This author is hardly the only one raising these criticisms. There 
is increasing public airing of insider discomfort and discussion of 
ICSID’s corporate bias.  In 2014, prominent trade lawyer George 
Kahale III publicly declared that ICSID tribunals, before which he 
has argued cases, are increasingly biased in favor of the foreign 
investors.50  Such insider critics have pointed out, since ICSID does 
not build its cases on legal precedents nor allow for appeals based 
on judicial reviews, there are no ways to correct such rulings.51  As 
Kahale phrased it, “The system is broken.” Kahale has also 
denounced the agreements that have empowered hundreds of 
                                                     
47  ICSID Secretariat, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2014-2), at 7 (2014), 
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/ 
Documents/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202014-2%20%28English%29.pdf.  A list of 
completed and pending cases can be found at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx, accessed January 7, 2015.  
(This was formerly: <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp>). 
48  See supra Part 1. 
49  See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
50  See generally George Kahale, Keynote Speech at Eight Annual Juris 
Investment Treaty Arbitration Conference, Washington, D.C. at 4 (Mar. 28, 2014), 
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=dff029f2-594e- 
48b5-8318-f02adf7b632c (citing to transcript). 
51  E.g., Nassib Ziadé, Is ICSID Heading in the Wrong Direction, BILATERALS.ORG 
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.bilaterals.org/?is-icsid-heading-in-the-wrong. 
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corporations to pursue these ICSID cases as “weapons of legal 
destruction.”52 
Such criticism has been matched by member-country discomfort 
and action.  Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela—all part of the original 
Tokyo No—have left ICSID.53  South Africa is establishing a new 
investment law that allows foreign corporations to bring such claims 
only to domestic courts.54  India is conducting a review of its treaties 
in the face of several corporate lawsuits,55  and Indonesia has 
announced its intent not to renew its bilateral investment treaties.56  
Australia declined to include these corporate rights in the 2005 
Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.57  Brazil has stayed out of 
investor-state dispute mechanisms.58 
A related set of biases moves beyond the concerns of the Tokyo 
No fifty years ago.  Here the argument is that ICSID’s purview is too 
narrow.  Why, for example, should the investor—as a non-state 
                                                     
52  Supra note 50. 
53  Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does 
Not Achieve, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/ 
itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-
achieve/; Nicolas Boeglin, ICSID and Latin America: Criticisms, Withdrawals and 
Regional Alternatives, BILATERALS.ORG (June 25, 2013), http://www.bilaterals.org/? 
icsid-and-latin-america-criticisms. 
54  Jackwell Feris, Challenging the Status Quo – South Africa’s Termination of its 
Bilateral Trade Agreements, Publications, DLA PIPER (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www. 
dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2014/12/international-arbitration-
newsletter-q4-2014/challenging-the-status-quo/. 
55  Supra note 1; Kavaljit Singh, India and Bilateral Investment Treaties – Are They 
Worth It?, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 21, 2015), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-
brics/2015/01/21/guest-post-india-and-bilateral-investment-treaties-are-they-
worth-it/?.  
56  Ben Bland and Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More Than 60 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3WTC8rx2C; 
Abdulkadir Jailani, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia’s Experience: IIA Review 
(Feb. 25-27, 2015), http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Indonesia_side-event-Wednesday_model-
agreements.pdf; Matthew J. Skinner & Zara Shafruddin, Turning Tides, Publications, 
JONES DAY (Oct. 2014), http://www.jonesday.com/Turning-Tides-What-
Indonesias-Reconsideration-of-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Means-for-Foreign-
Investors-10-10-2014/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium= syndication& 
utm_campaign=View-Original.  
57  Ann Capling and Kim Richard, Blowback: Investor-State Dispute Mechanisms 
in International Trade Agreements, 19(2) GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS 151, 165 (2006). 
58  Elizabeth Whitsitt & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: Yes 
or No, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2008), http://www.iisd.org/ 
itn/2008/11/30/investment-arbitration-in-brazil-yes-or-no/.  
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actor—have the right to sue the government, while other 
presumably key non-state actors such as the affected communities 
are not even allowed to listen to ICSID’s often secret hearings, never 
mind participate equally?  Yes, there have been some small steps to 
expand the potential voices heard by ICSID  arbitrators:  
communities can submit amicus briefs59 — but only if they find a 
lawyer60 willing to write one on their behalf and if the tribunal 
accepts the submission.  This is hardly true participation.  And there 
is not even any assurance that such briefs will be read or taken into 
account by the ICSID arbitrators who preside over any given case. 
At the time of ICSID’s founding, there were few universal 
human rights instruments, save the ILO conventions and the 1948 
UN Declaration of Human Rights.61  While there were a couple of 
environmental treaties concluded prior to the advent of the ICSID 
Convention, the international community focused its environmental 
law-making efforts on the environmental field only after the 1972 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.62  In addition, 
the key international instruments on the rights of indigenous peoples, 
namely ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, date from 1989 and 2007, respectively.63  But 
much has changed since the mid-1960s, including widespread 
understanding of the centrality of environmental issues.  The 
                                                     
59 On ICSID’s 2006 rule changes to allow amicus briefs, see Gary Born, et al., 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: ICSID Amends Investor-State Arbitration Rules, 
Publications & News, WILMERHALE (Apr. 2006), http://www.wilmerhale.com/ 
pages/publicationsandNewsDetail.aspx?NewsPubId=90393 (discussing ICSID’s 
2006 rule changes, including Arbitration Rule 37 allowing amicus briefs). 
60 In the El Salvador case, for example, the Center for International 
Environmental Law provided the legal expertise needed to write such a brief.  See 
Benjamin Miller, Jennifer Liu, Ramin Wright, and Jenny Yoo, The Guide for Potential 
Amici in International Investment Arbitrations, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 15-16 (Jan. 2014), http://ciel.org/Publications/Guide_ 
PotentialAmici_Jan2014.pdf. 
 61  The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, 
United Nations Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/ 
Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
 62  DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 146 
(4th ed. 2010). 
 63 Convention No. 169, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm (last 
visited May 9, 2015); Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, http://undesadspd.org/ 
indigenouspeoples/declarationontherightsofindigenouspeoples.aspx (last visited 
May 1, 2015).  
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Salvadoran government should be allowed, indeed encouraged, to 
protect a key watershed from the adverse environmental impacts of 
gold mining.  Our instruments of global governance should be 
structured to reward a government for so doing, rather than 
punished by being sued at ICSID.  It should be the duty of 
governments – from local to national to global levels – to privilege 
their responsibility to protect people and their ecosystems. 
In its current structure, ISDS clauses and rulings by ICSID do the 
exact opposite – providing a negative incentive on a national level 
for environmental and social regulations, for fear of being sued for 
“indirect taking” via regulation.  This is what has been termed 
“regulatory chill.”64 
 
5. THE URGENCY FOR CHANGE 
 
To say that the outcome of the Pac Rim Cayman suit at ICSID 
has profound ramifications for the future of El Salvador is an 
understatement.  So too does it provide lessons about better ways 
forward vis-à-vis investor-state regimes. 
There is urgency to this topic given far-reaching trade 
agreements on the horizon—the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)65—
that the Obama administration is negotiating with nations in the 
Pacific and in Europe.  If either or both are approved with investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions exemplified by the latest 
TPP version (as of this writing), ICSID’s caseload will mushroom 
further.  And we can expect even more action in terms of investors’ 
propensity to sue governments not just for direct taking via 
expropriation (the original purpose of ICSID), but also for indirect 
                                                     
64  See, e.g., Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State 
Disputes and the Protection of the Environment in Developing Countries, GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, Nov. 2006, at 73, 85 (“The notion that regulators fear 
raising environmental standards beyond the status quo because they believe it may 
deter new investment or cause industrial flight has been termed regulatory chill.”).  
65  See Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, A Strategic Fight against Corporate Rule, 
THE NATION, Feb. 3, 2014, available at http://www.thenation.com/ 
article/177930/global-fight-against-corporate-rule (discussing the emerging 
movement to “reverse the momentum” or national corporations which have 
written and rewritten “hundreds of rules skewing tax, trade, investment, and other 
policies in their favor” to the detriment of communities and governments).  To 
follow the controversy and protests, see Globalization & Trade, PUBLIC CITIZEN, 
http://www.citizen.org/trade/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). 
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taking via environmental, social, and other regulations that might 
impinge on a foreign investor’s future ability to make profits by 
irresponsible exploitation of a country’s resources. 
Recently leaked documents suggest that several governments 
are attempting to at least scale back investors’ rights (and, thus, the 
power of ICSID) in these draft trade deals.  This includes countries 
in the European Union—notably France and Germany—voicing 
concerns about the investor-state provisions they contain.66 
It is also important to refute some misunderstandings about the 
need for such investor rights’ protections and for ICSID.  Proponents 
would have one believe that the global economy would be seriously 
damaged without such investor rights (as in the current ISDS 
clauses) and their key venue ICSID, and that foreign investment 
would dry up should a country not sign ISDS clauses and be an 
ICSID member.67  To counter this hypothesis, one can simply point 
                                                     
66  On these member country actions, see Matthew J. Skinner and Zara 
Shafruddin, Turning Tides: What Indonesia’s Reconsideration of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Means for Foreign Investors, Jones Day Publications, JONES DAY (Oct. 2014), 
http://www.jonesday.com/Turning-Tides-What-Indonesias-Reconsideration-of-
Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Means-for-Foreign-Investors-10-10-2014/?RSS= 
true# (explaining that Indonesia is not renewing its bilateral treaty with the 
Netherlands); Dario Sarmadi, Commission Mulls TTIP Minus Investor Arbitration, 
EURACTIV (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/ 
commission-mulls-ttip-minus-investor-arbitration-309460 (stating that the 
European Commission is debating whether to include investor arbitration in the 
TTIP); The Arbitration Game, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014, at 78), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21623756/print (expounding that some 
countries are withdrawing from treaties with ISDS clauses because of problems in 
the arbitration process ); and Cécile Barbière & Anne-Claude Martin, French 
government will not sign TTIP agreement in 2015, EURACTIV (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/french-government-will-not-
sign-ttip-agreement-2015-310037 (illustrating that some European Union countries 
oppose ISDS clauses). 
  On states and citizens in the US “getting proactive” on TPP, see Karen 
Hansen-Kuhn, States get proactive on trade agreements: The Maine model, INSTITUTE FOR 
AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY (July 16, 2014), http://www.iatp.org/blog/ 
201407/states-get-proactive-on-trade-agreements-the-maine-model.  See also the 
campaigns and publications of the Council of Canadians, and its chairperson 
Maude Barlow, California Drought, MEDIA LE CONSEIL DES CANADIENS, 
http://www.canadians.org/media (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (exemplifying 
Barlow’s objections to trade agreements), as well as that of Public Citizen’s Global 
Trade Watch, and its director Lori Wallach, Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s 
Global Trade Watch, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/trade/article_ 
redirect.cfm?ID=17010 (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (providing articles about trade 
agreements involving the United States).  
67  Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, From “Dealing in Virtue” to 
“Profiting from Injustice”: The Case Against “Re-Stratification” of Investment 
Dispute Settlement, 55 HARV. INT’L L. J. 45, 50 (2014); Editorial Board, Don’t Buy the 
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to Brazil, a leading host to foreign investment but, again, a country 
that has never accepted investor-state dispute settlement in any 
venue.  To make a more general point:  Foreign investors, if they 
believe they are making a risky investment, can simply rely on 
foreign risk insurance.  And, like domestic investors, they have 
recourse to the relevant domestic courts in a given country.  Indeed, 
here is another example of the bias created by ISDS’s reliance on 
global venues such as ICSID:  domestic firms have to go through 
domestic courts; so should foreign firms.68 
Those who follow the World Trade Organization and its dispute 
resolution mechanism might note the irony:  A fundamental rule of 
today’s neoliberal push towards “ultra-globalization,” as embedded 
in the WTO,69 is that a country’s rules must treat foreign and 
domestic investors the same.  The irony is, of course, that ICSID’s 
existence seems to suggest that such ultra-globalization proponents 
do not find it problematic to have foreign investors privileged over 
domestic investors. 
Fifty years ago, those 21 governments who were part of Tokyo 
No were prescient in their concerns about ICSID and ISDS.  This 
article, with its central case study of Pac Rim Cayman LLC v 
Republic of El Salvador demonstrates how an investor-state tribunal 
that represents itself as an objective institution to resolve disputes 
between the two sides has increased its biases toward the private 
                                                     
Trade Deal Alarmism, The Washington Post, March 11 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dont-buy-the-trade-deal-
alarmism/2015/03/11/41575fee-c1d5-11e4-9271-610273846239_story.html; and 
Time Worstall, Explaining TTIP and ISDS to George Monbiot One More Time, 
Forbes, Jan. 14, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/01/14/ 
explaining-ttip-and-isds-to-george-monbiot-one-more-time/. 
68  For more on the questionable relationship between investor-rights regimes 
and FDI levels, see RETHINKING FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA (Kevin Gallagher & Daniel Chudnovsky, eds., 
Anthem Press 2010); Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote 
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 
405-409 (2010) (discussing the relationship between BITs, increased FDI flow, and 
property rights).  Contra BITs ‘Not Decisive’ in Attracting Investment, Says South 
Africa, Third World Network Info Services on WTO and Trade Issues, THIRD WORLD 
NETWORK (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.twn.my/ 
title2/wto.info/2012/twninfo121001.htm (explaining the South African 
government’s position that there is “no clear relationship” between BITs and 
increased inflows of FDI). 
69  World Trade Organization, Settling Disputes, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, 55, 
(2015), available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ 
understanding_e.pdf.  
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corporation/investor side and commercial over non-commercial 
interests. 
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